Education Reform in Pakistan
Political Activism?
as a good/service and education as a basic right to
reflect on the irrelevance of the idea of public demand
to the reforms in public sector schools. The former view
lends education for analysis in demand and supply terms
but the latter leads us to view the problem of education
in political and legal, rather than economic, terms. It is
mutually contradictory to speak of education, in the
same breath, as a basic right that must be guaranteed
irrespective of the individual circumstances — and as a
good/service that is procured in accordance with the
individual circumstance. If it has been secured as a
( justiciable) basic right, then we should not expect the
public to demand it. Rather, we should expect the legal
and executive branches of the state to “protect” it. Basic
rights are not supplied. They are demanded as long as
they have not been constitutionally secured. After they
have been politically secured, it makes no sense to look
for their demand. Rather, the activism should focus more
on finding legal and political ways of ensuring that the
constitutional provisions are delivered in their letter and
spirit. Therefore, it is possible that when we invest our
energies in stimulating demand by “poor” parents, we
move in the wrong direction.
To recapitulate, I have briefly argued that the logic of
demand and supply works best when the scene is market
and parents are autonomous, self-contained, agentive,
and individualistic consumers. But when the scene is
described by the constitution of the state and when
education is a basic right, the logic of public demand
and its articulation is not as relevant. Basic rights are not
goods, and politicians not suppliers. Once secured
constitutionally, rights are no longer to be demanded,
they are to be guaranteed and protected, just like any
other provision of the constitution. The phrase “demand
for basic rights” typically finds expression in those
situations in which those rights are not yet secured.
Would it not sound contradictory to speak about
education as a “right” — which requires activism aimed
at its protection through political and legal guarantees
— and a “good/service” — which is subject to the logic
of demand and supply — in the same breath? What
happens when, in our rhetoric, politicians implicitly
assume the subject position of suppliers? It is only when
they assume that subject position that they can turn
around and tell us, “Look, no one is knocking at our
doors, so what do we do?” This response is appropriate
if they are positioned as suppliers of education, but not
appropriate if they are positioned as protectors of basic
rights guaranteed by the constitution. Once positioned
as protectors of basic rights they, as well as the institutions
of state in general, need to be held accountable
irrespective of demand or its aggregates. The focus of
analysis and action doesn't have to be on whether there
is (or isn't) enough demand for education and whether
or not it is articulated or aggregated. The 18th
Amendment
provides the reformers with a single point agenda: make
the state, its various institutions, and the political guardians
of the Constitution accountable for securing the provisions
of the Constitution.
3
This requires a concerted, and
focused, campaign by the influential elites, civil society
organisations, and the media. I have emphasised “in-
fluential” in the preceding sentence because it is a bit of
a stretch to expect disadvantaged parents to collectively
voice their demand for education. Some will argue that
when people can mobilise to demand freedom and the
rule of law, then why is it a stretch to expect the same
for education? Such an objection assumes congruence
between the (abstract) notions of freedom and education
as potential motivators for political action. While there
is ample historical evidence for the former as a motivator
of political action, there is little for the latter.
4
Finally, by
way of a positive proposal, I would like to follow Amartya
Sen and Jean Drèze in saying that education is not a
sufficiently political issue (1999). Sen and Drèze were
concerned with this political deficit regarding education
in India. As they put it:
There is no question that, even in a country as
poor as India, means can be found to ensure
universal attainment of literacy and other basic
educational achievements, at least in the younger
age groups. There are important strategic ques-
tions to consider in implementing that social
commitment, but the primary challenge is to make
it a more compelling political issue. (p. 139)
Sen and Dreze argue that such was not the case in the
as a good/service and education as a basic right to
reflect on the irrelevance of the idea of public demand
to the reforms in public sector schools. The former view
lends education for analysis in demand and supply terms
but the latter leads us to view the problem of education
in political and legal, rather than economic, terms. It is
mutually contradictory to speak of education, in the
same breath, as a basic right that must be guaranteed
irrespective of the individual circumstances — and as a
good/service that is procured in accordance with the
individual circumstance. If it has been secured as a
( justiciable) basic right, then we should not expect the
public to demand it. Rather, we should expect the legal
and executive branches of the state to “protect” it. Basic
rights are not supplied. They are demanded as long as
they have not been constitutionally secured. After they
have been politically secured, it makes no sense to look
for their demand. Rather, the activism should focus more
on finding legal and political ways of ensuring that the
constitutional provisions are delivered in their letter and
spirit. Therefore, it is possible that when we invest our
energies in stimulating demand by “poor” parents, we
move in the wrong direction.
To recapitulate, I have briefly argued that the logic of
demand and supply works best when the scene is market
and parents are autonomous, self-contained, agentive,
and individualistic consumers. But when the scene is
described by the constitution of the state and when
education is a basic right, the logic of public demand
and its articulation is not as relevant. Basic rights are not
goods, and politicians not suppliers. Once secured
constitutionally, rights are no longer to be demanded,
they are to be guaranteed and protected, just like any
other provision of the constitution. The phrase “demand
for basic rights” typically finds expression in those
situations in which those rights are not yet secured.
Would it not sound contradictory to speak about
education as a “right” — which requires activism aimed
at its protection through political and legal guarantees
— and a “good/service” — which is subject to the logic
of demand and supply — in the same breath? What
happens when, in our rhetoric, politicians implicitly
assume the subject position of suppliers? It is only when
they assume that subject position that they can turn
around and tell us, “Look, no one is knocking at our
doors, so what do we do?” This response is appropriate
if they are positioned as suppliers of education, but not
appropriate if they are positioned as protectors of basic
rights guaranteed by the constitution. Once positioned
as protectors of basic rights they, as well as the institutions
of state in general, need to be held accountable
irrespective of demand or its aggregates. The focus of
analysis and action doesn't have to be on whether there
is (or isn't) enough demand for education and whether
or not it is articulated or aggregated. The 18th
Amendment
provides the reformers with a single point agenda: make
the state, its various institutions, and the political guardians
of the Constitution accountable for securing the provisions
of the Constitution.
3
This requires a concerted, and
focused, campaign by the influential elites, civil society
organisations, and the media. I have emphasised “in-
fluential” in the preceding sentence because it is a bit of
a stretch to expect disadvantaged parents to collectively
voice their demand for education. Some will argue that
when people can mobilise to demand freedom and the
rule of law, then why is it a stretch to expect the same
for education? Such an objection assumes congruence
between the (abstract) notions of freedom and education
as potential motivators for political action. While there
is ample historical evidence for the former as a motivator
of political action, there is little for the latter.
4
Finally, by
way of a positive proposal, I would like to follow Amartya
Sen and Jean Drèze in saying that education is not a
sufficiently political issue (1999). Sen and Drèze were
concerned with this political deficit regarding education
in India. As they put it:
There is no question that, even in a country as
poor as India, means can be found to ensure
universal attainment of literacy and other basic
educational achievements, at least in the younger
age groups. There are important strategic ques-
tions to consider in implementing that social
commitment, but the primary challenge is to make
it a more compelling political issue. (p. 139)
Sen and Dreze argue that such was not the case in the
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